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PARTIES 
The following is a statement of the parties to this action: 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES, INC. a Utah corporation d/b/a HOPE OF 
AMERICA THRIFT STORE; SINE INVESTMENT, INC., d/b/a SCOTTY'S TRAVEL 
MOTOR HOTELS; SITE, INC., d/b/a TEN PIN LOUNGE; RANCHO LANES, INC., 
d/b/a RANCHO 42 LANES RECREATION CENTER; JERRY SINE INVESTMENTS, a 
partnership d/b/a SE RANCHO MOTOR HOTEL; and STOCKHOLM RESTAURANT, 
INC. ; 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Municipal Corporation of the State of 
Utah; SALT LAKE CITY MAYOR, TED WILSON; AL HAYNES, Assistant to the 
Salt Lake City Mayor; CITY ENGINEER, MAX PETERSON; RICK JOHNSTON, 
Assistant City Engineer; STATE OF UTAH; SCOTT MATHESON, as Governor 
Of the State of Utah; STATE COUNCIL OF DEFENSE; STATE ROAD 
COMMISSION; AND SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of 
the State of Utah; 
Defendants and Respondents. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES, ] 
INC., et al., ] 
Plaintiffs and ] 
Appellants, ] 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, ] 
et a L , ] 
Defendants and ] 
Respondents. ] 
i Case No. 910471 
APPELLANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENCE & DAMAGES ARE BEFORE THE COURT 
The Defendants have taken the position that the flood of 1983 
was a pure product of nature, a 100 year occasion that could not be 
controlled. 
The facts as construed by the Plaintiffs, show that the 
Defendants, rather than being the saviors of the community in 
mitigating damages to that community by diverting the waters from 
the conduit to the surface, i.e. State Street and North Temple 
West of 5th West, actually caused the need to divert to the surface 
by the negligent removal of parts of the grate (Holzworth 
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Deposition R. 581 pg. 16) at the entrance to the City Creek 
Culvert, thereby allowing large boulders, rocks as big as one foot 
in diameter (Holzworth Deposition R. 581 pg. 21) and other 
potential obstacles to enter the culvert, thereby allowing the 
upper culvert to plug, plus a lack of maintenance in the lower 
culvert i.e. North Temple from 5th West to the Jordan River, which 
contributed to that section plugging when the flow of water was 
negligently shut off thereby allowing the sediment in the water to 
settle out (Affidavit Dr. Lin R.1483 paragraph 14). 
As the upper culvert plugged, the Defendants stopped the flow 
into that upper culvert and diverted the water above ground to 
State Street. The stopping of the water flow through the culvert 
allowed the sediment, which was suspended in the water flow to drop 
out and to clog the North Temple West of the 5th South section of 
the culvert because of the sediment that had been allowed to 
accumulate over the years (Dr. Lin's Deposition R.1495, pgs. 12, 
18, 19, 20 and 21). 
If the flow of water had not been stopped then the culvert 
would not have clogged. If the lower culvert had been cleaned at 
least yearly as stated by Dr. Lin to be the proper maintenance 
procedure (Dr. Lin's Affidavit R.1482 and 1483 pg-3), it would not 
have clogged when the water flow was stopped and when the water was 
started up again, the North Temple west of 5th West would have not 
had to be dug up or blocked off. Dr. Lin's Affidavit R.1482 and 
1483 states that "These enclosed pipe systems quickly lose their 
ability to convey water and debris if they are not cleaned as often 
2 
as necessary/ usually at least once a year before the spring run-
off. " 
The acts of negligence are simple: 
(1) No cleaning the culvert on a yearly basis; therefore 
setting it up to be susceptible to clog. 
(2) Breaking the grating while attempting to clean it, 
the bars of the grating were 4" to 5" apart (Anderson Deposition 
R.600 pg.18) and thereby allowing large particles, rocks as big as 
one foot diameter (Holzworth Deposition R.581 pg.21) to 2 feet in 
diameter (Helms Deposition R.583 pg.10), into the upper culvert 
from Memory Grove to the North Temple Viaduct which ultimately 
clogged the upper culvert. 
(3) When the upper culvert clogged, the Defendants 
stopped the flow of water to the culvert so that the upper culvert 
could be cleaned which allowed to particles in both the upper and 
the lower culvert to settle out, and with the accumulation already 
there from prior years, subsequently clogging the lower culvert. 
(4) The Defendants then tried to clean the lower culvert 
in desperation and because they were using items not meant to be 
used in a 7 foot culvert, a drag line connected to a bucket, the 
bucket broke leaving the drag line in the culvert. 
Subsequently,this prevented Helms from using his equipment and 
prolonged the time necessary to clean that portion of the aqueduct 
(Deposition Helms R.583 pg.27 lines 10-20, pg.28). 
The Defendants now say, trying to cover themselves from 
liability, that these were discretionary acts and thereby protected 
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by governmental immunity. 
To the Contrary, these are the types of negligent acts for 
which the state legislature removed governmental immunity. 
Dr. Lin states unequivocally, contrary to the opinion of the 
District court, that minimum maintenance consisted of at least one 
cleaning per year (Dr. Lin's Affidavit R.1482 and 1483 paragraph 
11) • Maybe more if an inspection designates the need. Not only do 
we not have the Defendants not cleaning the culvert on a yearly 
basis, there is evidence that it has not been cleaned by them for 
many years. 
Not one of the Defendants-even though two Defendants (the 
State of Utah and Salt Lake County) were clearly mandated by the 
legislature to maintain the culvert, and the third Defendant (Salt 
Lake City) , either by contract or by assumption of the 
responsibility-made any effort to clean the culvert before the 
emergency became critical. This is gross negligence in its extreme 
and is obviously a jury question.. 
The claimed inspection by the City by opening several man hole 
covers does not protect them but shows they suspected a problem but 
did not take adequate steps to correct a potential exposure. This 
did not prove that the culverts were clean. Besides Dr. Lin 
testified that the standard in the industry was to clean the 
culvert at least once a year. 
The type of material found in the culvert after it was opened 
was dry according to sworn testimony of Barry Sine (Plaintiff 
Interrogatory R.997 answer to point 2.11). The material was 
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classified as a cementatious consistency by Mr. Helen who cleaned 
the aqueducts (Definition from the American College Dictionary 
defines substances which are soft when first prepared but later 
become hard or stone like as cementatious). 
Based upon Mr. Helms deposition, an affidavit of Barry Sine, 
and other information available to him, Dr. Lin gives his opinion 
that the materials had been there for some time-up to two years 
(Affidavit of Dr. Lin R.1482, 1483). 
Dr. Lin is an expert witness. He taught this very subject at 
the University of Utah. He consulted for others on this subject. 
As an expert he can base his opinion on the facts that are before 
him. 
Even though Plaintiffs exhibit "G" has been struck out by this 
court upon motion of defendant Salt lake City, the damage issue was 
not ruled upon by the lower court. The lower court did mention 
that the damages were for lost revenues but no determination as to 
the whether or not adequate information had been presented by the 
Plaintiffs. Certainly the Plaintiffs7 expert witness testified as 
to a loss of revenues during this period and that the final figure 
would range between $60,000 to $200,000 (Deposition Norman Merrill, 
R.1537 pgs.50-53). 
Additionally, Barry W. Sine swore under oath as a party to the 
verified complaint, that the damages to the various entities were 
above $500,000. Mr. Sine was an officer of each corporation and 
therefore had available to him the various amounts through personal 
knowledge (R.541, 542, 543, 545, and 547). 
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It would seem therefore that there is not a lack of 
information on damages for a jury to make a determination. 
POINT II 
ANSWER TO SALT LAKE COUNTY fS RES IPSA LOQUITUR ARGUMENT 
In answering Salt Lake County Res ipsa loquitur argument, the 
conduit was under the State's control pursuant to Section 27-12-21 
UCA (1) where it states, "All roads and streets within the state, 
or which, by legislative action xxxx xxx are designated as State 
Highways shall be known as Class A State Roads. The State Road 
Commission shall have jurisdiction and control over all State 
Highways and said highways (Highways include culverts-see UCA 
Section 27-12-2(8)) shall be constructed and maintained by the 
Commission from funds which shall be made available", furthermore 
pursuant to Section 27-12-88 UCA - (1) which states, "The State 
Road Commission shall have jurisdiction over and shall be 
responsible for the construction and maintenance", who then 
assigned the responsibility to the Salt Lake County, who then 
contracted the responsibility to Salt Lake City who accepted the 
responsibility prior to the flood, for the storm facilities. 
The culvert, its condition, and maintenance were under the 
control of the State, the County, and the City during the critical 
time prior to the flood and none of these governmental agencies 
cleaned out the culvert. Each claims that they did not have the 
duty to clean out the culvert- The non-cleaning of the culvert was 
the negligent act, not the run off or the heavy snow pack-there was 
ample notice that everything needed to be in optimum condition for 
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what was to come. 
The Corp of Army Engineers claimed the culvert at the Jordan 
River could handle 500 cfs (R.431 papagraph 29) . This is much 
higher than the peak of the flood. John Holzworth acknowledged 
370 cfs capacity (R.581 pg. 52) . Therefore if the culvert had been 
clean (Dr. Lin stated it needed to be cleaned yearly) , it could 
have handled the water flow, at least at the North Temple area, 
i.e. that area from where the pipe surfaces (300 West) and then 
goes back under ground to the Jordan River. 
POINT III 
MAINTENANCE OF THE CULVERT 
The Highway Commission was responsible to adopt a uniform plan 
for maintenance of State Highways (UCA 27-12-104) which under the 
definitions included the culvert. This it did not do or did not 
pass on to the County (Holzworth Deposition R.581 pg.14) 
Dr. Lin stated the culvert should be cleaned at least on a 
yearly basis. The exception to the yearly cleaning should be an 
inspection which showed that the culvert needed to be cleaned more 
often. This inspection was not adequately carried out for a more 
than once a year cleaning and its failure did not cause the damage 
and therefore the culvert should have been cleaned yearly as 
dictated by Dr. Lin. This takes it outside of the immunity given 
to government under Section 63-30-10(4). 
Contrary to the County's argument, the cleaning of the culvert 
is not a basic governmental policy and therefore is not 
discretionary but is operational for which negligence may be found. 
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Under Dr. Lin's affidavit, the county tortured his testimony 
to an "as necessary" as the basic requirement, where Dr. Lin states 
as often as necessary usually once a year before the spring run 
off. Therefore the standard would seem to be at least once a year 
and more often if necessary. 
Dr. Lin's testimony was that the design of the aqueduct on 
North Temple necessitated at least a yearly cleaning and possibly 
more. None of this was done. To get around a yearly cleaning, the 
Defendants opened a man hole cover and inspected rather than 
cleaning the culvert, plus made an erroneous judgement based upon 
prior storms, to prove that the culvert was clean. All prima facia 
acts of negligence. 
POINT IV 
THE SUMMARY .JUDGMENT GRANTED TO THE STATE OF UTAH ON FEBRUARY 26, 
1991 SHOULD NOT BE A FINAL ORDER AND THIS APPEAL IS NOT BARRED AS 
TO THE STATE DEFENDANTS 
The fact situation as to the State of Utah's negligence in 
this action are the same as Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City. 
Originally City Creek ran down the middle of North Temple Street. 
In order to facilitate the road, the creek was forced into a 
culvert which runs under North Temple Street. This culvert was 
last replaced in 1973-74 by the Utah Department of Transportation 
(See Deposition Kay R.585 pg.12), and a new roadway placed above 
it. This was done by the Department of Transportation which is a 
State agency. The road is owed by the State. The land over which 
the creek runs is owed by the State. The culvert is owned by the 
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State. Under UCA Section 27-12-21 the State Road Commission shall 
maintain all State Highways. "All roads and streets within the 
State which, by legislative action or as otherwise provided by law, 
are designated as state highways shall be known as Class A State 
roads. The State Road Commission shall have jurisdiction and 
control over all state highways and said highways shall be 
constructed and maintained by the commission from funds which shall 
be made available for that purpose". 
Under Section 27-12-2(8)a "Public Highway is defined as any 
tunnel or culvert included within the right-of-way and any right-
of-way is land or property devoted to a highway" . A definition on 
the bottom of page 27-12-2(8) & (9). 
Therefore under the dictates of the legislature to the State 
Road Commission, they are mandated to maintain the highway in 
question including the culvert. 
Furthermore under Section 27-12-88 the State Road Commission 
has jurisdiction over and is responsible for the maintenance of 
that portion of any highway within a city located between the back 
of the curb on either side of the highway. 
Under section 27-12-107 the Commission is authorized to enter 
into contracts for the maintenance of state highways and may also 
enter into written agreements with any county for the maintenance 
of the highway. 
Clearly, the State had the first responsibility to maintain 
the culvert. Equally as clearly, the State had the ability to 
contract out to the county for the maintenance of the culvert. The 
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question becomes whether by contracting its responsibility to a 
sub-government entity, i.e. the county, whether it had and 
continued to have the duty to supervise that the maintenance was 
actually done. If the maintenance was not done, then was the State 
negligent in either not doing the work itself or in the county not 
performing the work or in the city not performing the work. 
Dr. Lin stated in his deposition and in his affidavit of 
December 10, 1990, (R.1483, paragraph 12) that the culvert needed 
to be cleaned "at least once each year before the spring run off". 
That to not clean at least once a year before the spring run off 
was not a good, accepted engineering practice. While he does 
mention that it should also be inspected his emphasis is on at 
least a yearly cleaning. It should also be inspected for 
additional cleanings, but they are not tied together. The 
government cannot say that because inspected is used, then 
maintenance is brought under the statute precluding government 
liability for non-inspecting. The Plaintiffs claims the act of 
negligence to be the lack of cleaning the culvert on a yearly basis 
prior to the spring run off, not upon the lack of a yearly 
inspection. 
Therefore, the factual situation is the same for each 
governmental agency. Was the lack of cleaning the aqueduct 
negligence, especially in the face of a greater than usual snow 
pack and a report by the Army engineers of the vulnerability of the 
City Creek area to flood? 
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If the State has no liability, then it could be argued that 
the County and the City have no liability, since at least part of 
their responsibility comes from the agreement from the State to the 
County and from the County to the City to clean the culvert. 
Therefore based upon Bennion vs. Pennzoil Company, 826 P. 2d 
137, 138 (Utah 1992) referenced by the Defendant State of Utah, the 
"certification was generally precluded where there was 'factual 
overlap' between the operative facts of the certified and un-
litigated claims and where the outcome of the appeal of the 
certified claims theoretically would have a res judicata effect on 
the un-litigated claims remaining before the trial 
court,...[A]claim is not separate if a decision on claims remaining 
below would moot the issue on appeal11. 
The record generated did not enable the court to separate the 
claims since the State had primary responsibility for the 
maintaining of the culvert. These were operational decisions. 
Furthermore, the District Court order did not on its face show 
that it was a final decision. That part of the order was hidden in 
the last paragraph. On a motion of this magnitude, a full hearing 
should have been held before the order was signed. 
Section 27-12-2(8) UCA. 
"Public Highway" means any road, street, alley, lane, court, 
peace, viaduct, tunnel, culvert, or bridge laid out or erected as 
such by the public, or dedicated or abandoned to the public, or 
made such in an action for the partition of real property, and 
includes the entire area within the right-of-way. 
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Section 27-12-107 UCA. 
"The Commission is authorized to enter into contracts for the 
construction and maintenance of State Highways, and may enter into 
written agreements on behalf of the State with any County, xxx for 
right of ways and construction or maintenance of any part of the 
state highways at the expense of the state, xxx" . 
Section 27-12-109 UCA. 
The commission is authorized to construct and maintain such 
appurtenances along the state highway system as are necessary for 
the public safety xx". 
Section 27-12-7 UCA. 
General Powers and Duties of Commission. "The commission 
shall administer the state highways and exercise those powers and 
duties which relate to the determination and carrying out of the 
general policy of the state relating thereto. It shall exercise 
such control over the location, establishment, changing, 
construction and maintenance of highways as is provided by law." 
Section 27-12-9 UCA. 
"The Department may sue and it may be sued only on written 
contracts made by it or under its authority." 
Section 27-12-104 UCA. 
"The Commission shall adopt uniform plans and specifications 
for the construction and maintenance of State highways, 
xxx xxx. " 
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POINT V 
THE RECORD DEVELOPED BY WRITTEN DISCOVERY WAS NOT ADEQUATE TO 
DETERMINED WHICH ACTIVITIES AND DECISIONS ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE 
STATE DEFENDANTS, AND WHETHER THOSE ACTIVITIES AND DECISIONS ARE 
PROTECTED BY THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
It is true that in 1984 all Defendants filed for Summary 
Judgment based upon governmental immunity. The case reversed in 
part and remanded on December 14, 1989. Under that decision this 
court stated: 
"In as much as this case was decided in the trial 
court on a motion for summary judgment, no full and 
adequate evidentiary hearing was held to resolve critical 
facts. Therefore, we do not have before us a record from 
which it can be determined who made the decisions 
pertaining to operation and maintenance of which 
Plaintiffs complain, when they were made, and under what 
conditions. These decisions may not have been made on 
the policy level on which decisions were made before the 
flood as to the design capacity, and construction of the 
City Creek drainage system. When the flood waters came, 
many decisions were doubtless made in a short period of 
time as to what course of action should be taken. An 
adequate record needs to be developed to separate what 
decisions qualify as "policy" from those that may have 
been only "operational"." (Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, 
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Inc. et al vs. Salt Lake City Corporation et al - 784 P2d 
459, 464.) 
The Defendants have taken what the court said out of context. 
It seems clear that what was called for was an evidentiary hearing 
not another Summary Judgment hearing. This directive was not 
complied with by the lower court and for this reason alone should 
be reversed for all parties and remanded with strict directive for 
a trial. 
Additionally, there are many issues of fact to be determined. 
The City claims the pipe had a five foot diameter (see City's Brief 
page 6, paragraph 1). The Plaintiffs claim a seven foot diameter. 
(See Deposition of Dr. Lin Ex. #2 R. 1497 & Deposition of Kay R.585 
pg.19) 
The Defendant City claims the design capacity was 250 cfs of 
pressurized flow. (Call Deposition p. 25, Exhibit "F" R 1021). 
Defendants witness for the County, Richard T. Holzworth 
acknowledges the system will handle 370 cfs according to the 
Nielsen and Maxwell Report of 1971 (R.581 pg.52). 
Both figures are considerably higher than the 200 cfs 
testified to by Haines, p. 11, Exhibit "G", R 1129. 
Obviously, if the system could handle 370 cfs, then it was 
able to handle the flows encountered if it had been clean. 
CONCLUSION 
If the Supreme Court ruled that an evidentiary hearing be 
held, then the Summary Judgment for the State cannot be barred by 
54(b) since Judicial economy dictate that it should be brought at 
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the same time as the County and the City. 
The Government can not under a policy decision pretense, place 
itself outside of a clear mandate by the legislature of 
responsibility for the maintenance of State roads and anything 
contained within them including the culvert 
The Defendants cannot get out from under their responsibility 
to these plaintiffs by claiming a lack of proof of damages, an by 
attacking Dr. Lin as an expert witness. 
Clearly, there are adequate facts to be heard by a jury to 
determine from the evidence which expert to be believed. The 
question of whether or not the culvert would have adequately 
handled the flood of 1983, but for the negligent acts of the 
Defendants in not cleaning the culvert on a yearly basis should be 
heard by a jury. The question of who removed the grates at the 
entrance to the culvert which negligently act subsequently allowed 
large boulders to plug the upper culvert and resulted in the 
plugging of the North Temple culvert when the water flow was shut 
off to clean the upper culvert, should be heard. 
Finally, what was this court's mandate from the original 
order. Did it mean a full evidentiary hearing as suggested by the 
Plaintiffs or could a simple Summary Judgment satisfy the demands 
of Justice. 
Clearly for Justice to be done, there is enough evidence 
before this court to show that the Summary Judgment should be 
overturned for all governmental Defendants and this action returned 
for a full jury trial to determine the full facts of whether or not 
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operational negligence was committed by the Defendants, and if so 
what the damages should be. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs pray this court to order this action 
remanded to the District Court for a full evidentiary hearing 
before a jury to determine the outcome of this action. 
Dated this 7'th day of September 1993. 
,1 
/ 
Wesley F. Sine-Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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